Abstract-In an effort to alleviate the perceived growth of a digital divide, the U.S. government enacted a major subsidy for Internet and communications investment in schools starting in 1998. In this paper, we evaluate the effect of the subsidy-known as the E-Rate-on Internet investment in California public schools. The program subsidized spending by 20%-90%, depending on school characteristics. Using new data on school technology usage in every school in California from 1996 to 2000 as well as application data from the E-Rate program, the results indicate that the subsidy did succeed in significantly increasing Internet investment. The implied first-dollar price elasticity of demand for Internet investment is between Ϫ0.4 and Ϫ1.1 and the greatest sensitivity is seen among urban schools and schools with large black and Hispanic student populations. Rural and predominantly white and Asian schools show much less sensitivity. Overall, by the final year of the sample, there were approximately 68% more Internet-connected classrooms per teacher than there would have been without the subsidy. Using a variety of test score results, however, we do not find significant effects of the E-Rate program, at least so far, on student performance.
I. Introduction
A s the Internet has grown in recent years, inequality of access and understanding of technology across income and racial lines has led to concern among policymakers about the so-called digital divide. This concern has generated many proposals to help close the divide, by both governments and private entities like the Gates Foundation.
Policymakers and analysts have argued that public schools are the natural place to teach underserved populations about computers. As part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the government began actively subsidizing Internet and telecommunications access in U.S. classrooms and libraries through a tax on long-distance services as a new, information-age component of the Universal Service Fund. 1 This new initiative, known as the E-Rate program, began in 1998 and provides up to $2.25 billion per year of subsidies to school and library investment in Internet and communications technology. To understand the magnitude of this subsidy, note that Lake (2000) estimates total public school spending on computers in 1999 (including hardware, software, training, networking, and so on) was only $3.3 billion. The E-Rate subsidy is, by far, the most ambitious federal technology program in schools. 2 Understanding the extent to which the $2.25 billion subsidy fulfilled its primary goal of increasing Internet usage in schools, particularly disadvantaged ones, versus merely subsidizing spending that was already taking place, is thus of greatest importance. There is also considerable interest in-and debate about-whether spending on computers and information technology has any impact on student performance (see Kirkpatrick & Cuban, 1998; Angrist & Lavy, 2002; Cuban, 2001) , and the creators of the E-Rate have argued that it can do more than just increase access, that it can improve basic student performance.
In this paper we provide an economic analysis of the impact of the E-Rate program on public schools' technology adoption over the 1996-2000 period. To do so, we use new data on the technology owned in each year by every school in California, covering fully 13% of public school enrollment in the U.S. 3 We merge these technology data with administrative data on every E-Rate funding application these same schools filed, including the amount of funding, the subsidy rate, and the purpose of the funding. We also use demographic data for each school and district from the National Center for Education Statistics Common Core of Data (CCD) and the 1990 U.S. Census.
We seek to determine whether schools with higher subsidy rates made greater investments in technology than they would have without the program and, if so, whether the increase in Internet access had any impact on observed student outcomes in the period. To do so, we must confront three difficulties in analyzing the program.
First, there was a clear upward trend in Internet access among public schools before the E-Rate program began. The data in U.S.D. O.E. (2000a) on the share of public school classrooms with access to the Internet, for example, shows the share increasing by a factor of 5 from 1994 to 1996 (from 3% in 1994 to 15% in 1996) , followed by continued growth through 1999 (51% in 1998 and 63% in 1999) . Though it is true that the time series shows a major increase in access in the first year of the E-Rate program, it is important to distinguish the program's effect from underlying trends. We do this by exploiting cross-sectional variation in the subsidy rate across schools in the same time periods and by looking at growth rates rather than levels.
The second problem we deal with is the fact that the cross-sectional variation in the subsidy rate (the subsidy rates range from 20% to 90%) depends on factors, such as the share of pupils qualifying for subsidized school lunches, which are likely to be correlated with unobserved tastes for technology in the school. To address these issues we explore a regression-discontinuity research design and include in a regression-based design flexible controls for the previous technology histories of these schools as well as the very school demographic characteristics that drive the variation in subsidy rates.
The third problem, which leads to an independently interesting observation, is that districts are allowed to decide which schools to include on their applications. Because the subsidy rate is determined by the distribution of school lunch percentages of participating schools, incentives exist for high-poverty districts to apply and for wealthier schools to convince higher-poverty schools in their district to join their applications. We show evidence that districts and schools did respond on both margins. Though this observation is interesting as a window into the workings of public schools, the resulting selection might lead to bias in our estimates, and we will need to be rather careful in dealing with this selection when estimating the impact of the subsidy on adoption rates.
The analysis shows several things. First, public schools in California responded to price incentives by increasing their investment in Internet technology. The first-dollar price elasticity of demand is between Ϫ0.4 and Ϫ1.1, and the greatest sensitivity shows up among urban schools and among schools with large black and Hispanic populations. There were substantially more Internet connections in schools in 2000 because of this program. We also present evidence that schools responded to the subsidies and program rules in strategic and optimizing ways. This estimate also raises the interesting and understudied question of how public-sector organizations respond to price variation. Finally, we look at how this increase in Internet access impacted test scores and find effects that are not distinguishable from 0.
The paper proceeds in eight parts. In section II, we describe the rules and history of the E-Rate program. In section III, we describe the data and present summary statistics. In section IV, we present the identification framework and the basic results. In section V, we address alternative interpretations of these results and present evidence of strategic behavior by public schools. In section VI, we examine which schools were more or less sensitive to the subsidy. And in section VII we present results on student outcomes. In section VIII we conclude.
II. The E-Rate Program
On May 7, 1997, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted a Universal Service Order implementing the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Order was designed to give all eligible schools and libraries affordable access to modern telecommunications and information services. The program began on January 1, 1998 and provided up to $2.25 billion annually (FCC, 1997a) . It is known as the E-Rate program.
The E-Rate program was not designed to have the government provide technology to schools, but rather to subsidize schools' purchases of such technology and to do so at a progressively sliding rate that depends on poverty rates and urban-rural status. The subsidy rate ranges from 20% to 90%, depending on the share of students that qualify for the national school lunch program as shown in table 1. 4 The subsidy can be used for spending on "all commercially available telecommunications services, Internet access, and internal connections." This includes services like basic telephone service, a T-1 line, telecommunications wiring, routers, and switches, local area networks, PBX, and Note: The table lists the subsidy rate awarded to schools in each of six categories based on the fraction of students eligible for the federal free and reduced-price school lunch programs. Columns 5 and 6 also list the totals of E-Rate funds awarded to California public schools in each category in the first three years of the program. Column 7 lists the ratio of Internet classrooms in 1996-1997 to full-time equivalent teachers in California public schools in each category.
other services whose primary purpose is delivering services into classrooms or other places of instruction. Support for administrative functions of a library or school is permitted if it is "part of the network of shared services for learning" (U.S. Department of Education, 1997a). Schools cannot get subsidies for things like software or computers, because they are not directly related to connections. Detailed information on what is eligible can be found in FCC (2001) .
Schools may apply for the program individually or as a school district. 5 The subsidy rate for individual schools is determined by the criteria in table 1. The subsidy rate for the district is based on the average share of school-luncheligible students across all participating schools (weighted by enrollment), but the rules require that the higher-level entities "must strive to ensure that each school receives full benefit of discount to which entitled" (U.S.D.O.E., 1997b) . We, of course, do not observe any type of side payments that might occur.
III. Data
The data are drawn from three sources. First, data from the U.S. and California Departments of Education give information on every public school in California. Wellknown data include enrollment counts by race, characteristics of teachers, and the fraction of students eligible for the federal free and reduced-price lunch programs. We also use new data that provide detailed school-level information on the number of computers used for instructional purposes and on the number of classrooms with Internet access in each school, starting with the 1996-1997 school year. Additional demographic characteristics from the schooldistrict-level tabulation of the 1990 census, such as the median household income and the median home value, are added.
We merge the California data with a second data set comprising administrative data from the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC) on every E-Rate subsidy application over the life of the program. Each application lists the total funds requested, the total funds granted, the subsidy rate that applies to the request, and a classification of the funds as Internet access, telecommunications services, or internal connections. The breakdown of E-Rate funding by intended use is shown in table 2. Of the E-Rate funds, 80% go to internal connections, 17% go to telecommunications services, and the remaining 3% are used for Internet access.
For our analysis, we drop E-Rate applications by libraries, private schools, and multidistrict consortia, which, combined, account for only about 10% of E-Rate spending in California. To get a subsidy rate for each school in the sample, we aggregate the application data to the school district level and use the average subsidy faced by applicant schools in the district. 6 The district-level data include funds requested and granted by type of request, and various measures of the subsidy rate, such as the mean, median, and mode. 7 Because schools within the district can apply strategically in light of the progressive subsidy rate, we compute the subsidy rate that would prevail if all the district's schools applied. As shown in sections IV and V, the results 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 do not substantively change if the predicted discount rate is used in its place. Table 2 also summarizes the Internet and computer access in California's public schools over time. By the 1997-1998 school year, the year before the first E-Rate funding was awarded, 55% of California's public schools had at least one classroom with Internet access, an increase of 9 percentage points from a year earlier. Using the number of teachers as a proxy of the number of classrooms (which we do not observe), we estimate that something like 26% of classrooms in California had Internet access. 8 By comparison, 93% of California schools used at least one computer for instructional purposes in 1997-1998; the average school had 2.2 computers per teacher.
As the E-Rate funds grew, Internet access was becoming more widespread. By 2000-2001, 85% of California schools had at least one classroom with Internet access, and two-thirds of all classrooms in California had Internet access. The fraction of California schools that used at least one computer for instructional purposes grew to 98% by [2000] [2001] , while the number of computers per teacher grew to 3.1.
Over the same time period, the federal government transferred almost $937 million to the public schools of California as a part of the E-Rate program. The bottom panel of table 2 shows the total E-Rate funding commitment both nationally and in California. 9 As is shown by the aggregate numbers, national E-Rate funding grew from $1.7 billion in 1998-1999 to $2.1 billion in [2000] [2001] . Approximately 15% of that funding went to applicants in California, where there was a sharp increase in requests in 2000-2001. This increase is entirely explained by the $230 million in E-Rate funding that the Los Angeles Unified School District received that year. 10 The next row of table 2 shows similar estimates of the trend in E-Rate funding using the data in our sample.
The strong time series correlation between the spread of Internet access and the advent of E-Rate funding does not, of course, establish a causal link. The E-Rate legislation was passed in the midst of a strong upward trend in the fraction of schools with Internet access. Thus, even in the absence of the federal subsidy, many school districts would likely have chosen to make Internet investments. In other words, whereas the intent of the E-Rate subsidy was to create marginal incentives for school districts to invest in Internet access and to help disadvantaged schools especially, much of the total money spent through the E-Rate program might have gone to inframarginal districts. It is thus instructive to document which districts received E-Rate funding.
Returning to table 1, we can consider who, on average, received the funds from the E-Rate program. On one hand, the E-Rate subsidy is more generous for poor districts, so funding might be greater for the poorer schools. On the other hand, these poor districts tend to have less technology or be less willing to pay for technology. Rich districts might have more investment spending on computers and the Internet and therefore get the lion's share of the subsidy money, despite having a lower subsidy rate. The data suggest that, in fact, the first consideration overwhelmed the second. The table shows that a greater share of the funds went to the poorer schools than would be expected by enrollment alone. Most of the E-Rate funds went to schools with subsidy rates of 80% and 90%-schools with more than 50% of their students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches from the federal government. The table also shows that the schools that received more generous subsidies had fewer Internet classrooms prior to the E-Rate program. Thus, E-Rate funding went disproportionately to schools with higher poverty rates and fewer Internet classrooms.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the data underlying the regressions in the next section. Figure 1 shows the average fraction of classrooms per district with Internet access. The yearly averages are shown separately for each of five groups of districts. Group 1 are the richest districts-those with less than 20% of their students eligible for the federal free or reduced-price lunch programs in 1997-1998. These districts received the least generous E-Rate subsidy. Group 2 are districts with between 20% and 40% of their students eligible for the federal free or reduced-price lunch programs in 1997-1998. Groups 3, 4, and 5 are defined similarly. Group 5 districts have the highest poverty rates and were 8 The number of teachers is almost surely an overestimate of the number of classrooms. Thus, our estimate of the fraction of classrooms with Internet access is a lower bound and probably explains why the national figures cited above are higher.
9 Evidence describing the funding commitments in more detail can be found in Puma, Chaplin, and Pape (2000) . 10 We repeated the analysis in the paper excluding Los Angeles, and the results were not affected. The figure shows yearly averages of the number of classrooms with Internet access per teacher for five groups of districts. The 1996-1997 school year is labeled 1996, etc. Group 1 is districts with 0% to 20% of their students eligible for the federal free or reduced-price lunch programs in 1997-1998, the year before the availability of the E-Rate subsidy. Similarly, group 2: 20% to 40% eligible; group 3: 40% to 60% eligible; group 4: 60% to 80% eligible; group 5: 80% to 100% eligible. eligible for the most generous subsidies. Figure 2 presents the ratio of usage for each group relative to group 1.
As shown in figure 1 , in 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 there was a strong negative correlation between district poverty rates and Internet access. In the first year of the data, the richest schools had almost 50% more Internet classrooms per teacher than the poorest, for instance. Over the next year (still before the E-Rate program), this discrepancy got even larger. Once the E-Rate program began in 1998, however, and the lowest two groups began receiving a large subsidy relative to the highest group, their relative number of Internet connections accelerated until, by 2000, some actually exceeded the connections in the richest school districts. Figure 2 shows this pattern. For each year, the figure shows the mean number of Internet classrooms per teacher in the wealthiest group of schools relative to each of the other groups. The figure highlights the reversal in Internet access rates of rich and poor schools-a closing of the digital divide-that occurred in the years in which the E-Rate subsidy was offered. It is also clear that most of the catch-up occurred among the poorest sets of schools, those eligible for the largest subsidies.
IV. Estimates of Internet Investment Elasticities
In this section we expand the suggestive analysis presented above to an analysis of school-level microdata. We are interested in estimating the relationship between the fraction of classrooms with Internet access (I st /C st ) and the E-Rate subsidy received by district d (s dt ). Inasmuch as we do not have data on the number of classrooms in each school, we use the number of classrooms with Internet access and divide by the number of teachers.
Note that s dt is 0 in all years prior to 1998, and later is a weighted average of s st , the subsidy for which an individual school applying on its own is eligible. The subsidy for which each individual school is eligible as a lone applier is calculated as
where m st is the fraction of students in school s eligible for the federal school lunch program, and f (⅐) is the step function described in columns 1-3 of 
where A dt is the set of schools included on district d's E-Rate application in year t, and e st is student enrollment in school s in year t. In other words, the subsidy received by a district is the enrollment-weighted average of the subsidies that individual schools on the application would get if they applied alone. We observe s dt in the administrative E-Rate data. As shown above, this subsidy rate depends on which schools are included on the E-Rate application. Because the decision of which schools to include on a district's application may be correlated with ε st , we compute an alternative subsidy: the subsidy the district would have received if it had been forced to include every school in the district on the application. This subsidy is simply
where D is the full set of schools in district d. Estimates using the actual subsidy received, s dt , can only be computed using schools that received E-Rate funding. Estimates using s dt can be computed for all districts. When we move to the regression estimates, we present estimates using both s dt and s dt . We favor the estimates that use s dt and include all schools-both appliers and nonappliers-because they avoid problems stemming from endogenous choice of which schools are included on the application. We discuss this point in more detail in section V. We next describe two strategies for estimating the relationship between I st /C st and s dt . We begin with, perhaps, the most intuitive approach: a regression-discontinuity (RD) research design in which we compare schools on either side of the cutoffs embedded in the step function used to compute the E-Rate subsidy. These estimates definitely suggest a strong investment response, but are too imprecise to draw clear conclusions from just the small number of schools around the cutoff points. This forces us to turn to a regres- The figure shows yearly ratios of the number of classrooms with Internet access to the number of teachers for four groups of districts, relative to a fifth group. The 1996-1997 school year is labeled 1996, etc. Group 1 (the reference group) is districts with 0% to 20% of their students eligible for the federal free or reduced-price lunch programs in 1997-1998, the year before the availability of the E-Rate subsidy. Similarly, group 2: 20% to 40% eligible; group 3: 40% to 60% eligible; group 4: 60% to 80% eligible; group 5: 80% to 100% eligible. sion framework which allows us to draw on the full sample of schools. These estimates are consistent with the RD estimates and are far more precise.
A. Regression-Discontinuity Estimates
Given the stark step function described in columns 1-3 of table 1, a natural research design would be to focus on schools that are near the cutoffs used to compute the E-Rate subsidy. Because the subsidy awarded to a district (s dt ) is a weighted average of the subsidies for which each school is eligible (s st ), schools just above and just below these cutoffs may receive quite different price subsidies. For example, an urban school applying alone with a meal percentage of 49 gets a 60% subsidy, while a similar urban school applying alone with a meal percentage of 50 gets an 80% subsidy. If there is nothing different between these two schools other than the fact that they are eligible for different E-Rate subsidies, then a simple comparison of Internet classrooms per teacher in the two groups would yield the effect of the price subsidy.
We show RD estimates in table 3. Rows 2-6 in the first column, report the difference in s dt for schools just above (that is, within 1 percentage point) and just below each of the five cutoffs. The first row shows the pooled difference, controlling for cutoff fixed effects. Around all but one of the cutoffs, schools with slightly higher meal percentages were eligible for significantly larger s dt than schools with lower meal percentages. The pooled estimate implies that schools just above the cutoffs were eligible for 2.8-percentagepoint-higher subsidies than schools just below. This difference has a standard error of 0.6 percentage points. 11 Columns 2 and 3 report differences in the level of Internet access in schools on either side of the cutoffs. Column 2 shows the differences for a period prior to the introduction of the E-Rate subsidies. Consistent with the RD identifying assumption, there are no significant differences in Internet access between these two groups of schools. Two of the five point estimates are negative, and the pooled estimate is a difference of 0.003 classrooms per teacher. Column 3 reports the differences for the period in which E-Rate subsidies were available. In all but one case the differences are larger, and the pooled difference of 0.055 classrooms is significant at the 10% level.
Column 4 reports Wald estimates of the effect of the subsidy on Internet classrooms per teacher. The table shows the difference in Internet access per teacher divided by the difference in the subsidy. This is the two-stage least squares estimate using an indicator for being just above the cutoff as an instrument for the subsidy. The pooled estimate is extremely large but only borderline significant at the 10% level. These coefficients are more than 10 times larger than the estimates we find below. However, the standard errors are large and the estimates at specific cutoffs are highly variable. All of the RD estimates are quite imprecise, owing to the number of data we must discard to focus on the schools very close to the cutoffs.
B. Regression Estimates
The RD estimates are too imprecise to draw strong conclusions. We therefore turn to a regression framework and use information from the full sample of schools to estimate the relationship of interest. Motivated by figure 1, we estimate the following investment equation:
where ⌬(I/C) st ϭ (I/C) st Ϫ (I/C) s tϪ1 is the change in the number of Internet classrooms per teacher for school s in year t, ␣ s and ␦ t are respectively school and year effects, m st is the fraction of students eligible for the federal school lunch program, and ε st is an error term. The school effects (␣ s ) identify consistent differences in Internet investment rates over the sample period, or, put differently, schoolspecific trends in Internet access. The coefficient of interest is ␤, which measures the effect of the subsidy on Internet investment.
In table 4, we present estimates of equation (1) using the framework developed in the previous section. The suggestive analysis in section III highlights strong secular trends in Internet access but also a significant relative increase in investment by high-poverty schools when the subsidy is offered. Our regression framework includes year effects to control for the secular trends in Internet investment rates, school effects to control for persistent differences in technology investment rates, and poverty measures to control for convergence related to income levels. The analysis asks whether schools with more generous subsidies increased Internet investment rates relative to secular trends in a way unexplained by poverty levels. The dependent variable is the 1-year change in the number of Internet-connected 11 Differences are not mechanically the size of the jumps shown in table 1, because the district's subsidy is a weighted average of each school's S st . Differences in actual subsidies received are even smaller, apparently because low-subsidy low-poverty schools are more likely to pair with schools that are just above a cutoff and that therefore have a higher S st . Note: The table shows the difference in the subsidy and Internet classrooms per teacher between schools just above and just below each of the five cutoffs in the E-Rate subsidy formula. Here "just above" and "just below" are defined as having a meal percentage within 1 percentage point of the respective cutoffs. The "pooled" row reports regression estimates of the pooled difference across all cutoffs, controlling for cutoff fixed effects. The "pre-E-Rate" column refers to data from 1996 to 1997. The "E-Rate" column refers to data from 1998 to 2000. The "Wald estimate" column reports the ratio of the difference in Internet classrooms per teacher to the difference in subsidy rates.
classrooms in the school per full-time equivalent teacher. 12 The number of teachers is again used as a proxy for the number of classrooms in a school. Thus, the dependent variable can be thought of as an estimate of the change in the fraction of classrooms in the school with Internet access. Regressions that use the change in the number of Internet classrooms (without dividing by the number of teachers) yield similar results, and can be found in a previous version of this paper (Goolsbee & Guryan, 2002) .
In column 4 of table 4 we present the estimate of the effect of s dt on Internet investment per teacher. This is the preferred base specification because it includes all schools in all districts, and thus is not affected by endogenous application decisions. The estimate of ␤ is positive and significant, implying that schools getting the biggest subsidies starting in 1998 did have larger increases in the growth rate of Internet access. 13 The magnitude indicates that a 10-percentage-point increase in the E-Rate subsidy was associated with an increase in the growth rate of Internet access of 0.0136 classrooms per teacher per year. If we take the number of full-time equivalent teachers in a school as a proxy for the number of classrooms, this estimate implies that a 10% increase in the subsidy is associated with a 1.36-percentage-point increase in the fraction of classrooms with Internet access per year. This estimate corresponds to an elasticity of Internet investment with respect to the first subsidy dollar of Ϫ1.1. 14 Of course, because this is a linear specification, the marginal elasticity declines as the subsidy increases. The marginal elasticity of Internet investment for appliers once they are already at the mean subsidy rate of 63% is closer to Ϫ0.4.
Using these results, we can estimate the total impact of the E-Rate program on Internet adoptions. For the mean school, if the subsidy rate were 0, the predicted number of Internet connected classrooms per teacher would be 0.396 by the end of the sample period (2000) (2001) . In fact, the true level with the subsidy was some 68% higher at 0.664.
Beyond what they say about the price sensitivity of Internet investment, these results are interesting in light of the lack of existing evidence on demand elasticities of public-sector organizations and the implications for public policy. The debate over school vouchers, for example, centers on the question of how public schools respond to incentives (see the discussion in Greene, 2001; Neal, 2002; Ladd, 2002; and Hoxby, 2003) . Our results are consistent with the view that public schools are quite responsive to economic incentives. 15
V. Alternative Explanations and Strategic Application Behavior
A potential alternative explanation of the results above that schools with high subsidies have faster growth of Internet connection is that as computer prices fall over time, poor schools (that is, the schools with high subsidy rates) find it worthwhile to get connected where in earlier periods they did not (though this still cannot explain why the gap between rich and poor schools expanded in the year before the E-Rate program started). Similarly, there could be some Note: The dependent variable is the increase in the number of classrooms with Internet access per teacher since last year. All standard errors allow for district-level correlation in the error term. Observations are at the school level. There is a separate observation for each year of the sample, from 1997-1998 to 2000-2001 . District nonappliers are schools in the districts in which no school ever applied during the sample period. School nonappliers are schools that did not apply in the current year. Appliers are schools that applied in the current year. The max Ϫ min of school subsidy in the district is equal to the difference between the maximum and the minimum subsidy for which individual schools within the district are eligible as lone appliers.
other unobserved variable, correlated with being poor, that was increasing relative Internet investment in the time period.
To investigate this alternative interpretation of the main result we compare the relationship between the subsidy rate and Internet investment for appliers and nonappliers. In column 1 of table 4, we present estimates for schools listed on E-Rate applications, using the actual subsidy received (s st ). The estimated effect for appliers is larger in magnitude (0.173), a fact that has two potential explanations. First, the earlier estimate included many nonapplying schools that should not have responded to a subsidy they did not receive. And second, one reason schools apply for the subsidy is that they would have invested in the technology in the absence of the subsidy (that is, appliers have higher ε st 's than nonappliers). The estimate for schools in districts that never applied for the E-Rate subsidy is reported in column 2 of table 4. In contrast with the estimate for the appliers, the estimate for nonappliers is not significantly different from 0, and the point estimate is much smaller. This contrast suggests that the base result is not driven by unobserved factors that happen to be correlated with the subsidy.
We do not take the appliers' estimate that uses the actual subsidy as our base specification, because we believe it to be biased by endogenous application choices. Because subsidy rates do not reach 100%, districts with greater demand for Internet investment should be more likely to apply for E-Rate funds. Further, because subsidy rates are determined by the poverty rates of applicant schools, applying districts have an incentive to include high-poverty (and exclude low-poverty) schools on their applications. This incentive is offset by efforts to ensure that E-Rate funds only go toward work done at applicant schools. However, the effects of these incentives are apparent in the data. Table 5 compares three groups of schools in 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 16 : schools that applied for E-Rate funds (column 1), schools that did not apply but were in districts where other schools applied (column 2), and schools that did not apply in districts where no one applied (column 3).
Districts that applied had higher meal percentages (that is, higher subsidy rates) than districts that did not. And within districts that applied, the schools that took part in the E-Rate subsidy program had higher meal percentages than those that did not take part. Note that schools appear to have reacted fairly strongly to the economic incentives created by the program rules. This piece of evidence is a window into the management of public schools and may suggest how they respond to outside economic forces. It also highlights a selection problem that almost certainly biases the estimates using a sample of appliers only. Note, however, that in our regression results we control for the school's poverty rate in a flexible way, so bias can only result if selection is based on something other than just the school lunch percentage.
The apparently strategic application behavior documented in table 5 raises another interesting question. Is there any evidence of spillovers from appliers to nonappliers within districts? In a Coasian sense, one might expect that spillovers would be largest in districts with large withindistrict differences in poverty rates across schools, because the gains to the high-poverty schools from excluding the low-poverty schools would be the greatest. We investigate this hypothesis by adding to the base specification for all nonapplying schools an interaction of the subsidy rate s dt with the difference between the maximum and minimum of s st within the district. This estimate is shown in column 3 of table 4. The estimated interaction is significant and positive, showing that districts with greater disparity across schools in eligible subsidy rates exhibit larger spillovers. Nonappliers in districts with no differences in subsidy rates across schools have an insignificant, negative correlation between the district subsidy rate and Internet growth rate per teacher. Nonappliers in districts with large differences in subsidy rates across schools look like they respond to the program. The largest possible difference across schools is 0.7 (90% rate Ϫ 20% rate). A school in such a district that did not apply for the E-rate responds to the subsidy rate with a coefficient of 0.060 (Ϫ0.060 ϩ 0.172 ϫ 0.7).
A third alternative explanation is that there are diminishing returns to expanding Internet connections, so schools that already have a lot of Internet connections will eventually slow down their growth relative to schools that do not. To some extent, this must be true, for the fraction of classrooms with Internet access cannot exceed 1, so the constant-growth-rate assumption embodied in the fixed effects cannot literally be true. To the extent the late adopters are high-poverty schools, the diminishing-returns story 16 We do not have school-level data on application status for the 2000-2001 school year. 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 . The year 2000-2001 is dropped because we do not have the necessary data. The first column includes schools that received E-Rate funds. The second column includes schools that did not receive E-Rate funds, but that are in districts in which other member schools received E-Rate funds. The third column includes schools in districts in which no schools received E-Rate funds. All category definitions are year-specific.
could generate a spurious correlation with the subsidy rate. In our specification, which assumes each school has a permanent trend in Internet investment, we have ruled out diminishing returns. We examine this possibility in column 5 of table 4 by interacting the subsidy rate with the number of Internet connections per teacher the school had at the start of the sample. If the diminishing-returns argument is relevant in our time period, this interaction should come in with a negative sign (greater initial number of connections leads to less price sensitivity). Note that we do not include the initial number of connections at the school on its own, because this is absorbed in the school fixed effect.
The results, shown in column 5 of table 4, are consistent with the convergence story. The interaction estimate is significantly negative. The magnitude of the effect, however, is much too small to explain our results. To see this, compare how much the responsiveness differs for schools at the 10th and 90th percentiles of the initial Internet-perteacher distribution. These schools have, respectively, 0 and 0.75 Internet classrooms per teacher in the 1996-1997 school year. The estimated coefficients are very close, at 0.138 and 0.104. The corresponding first-dollar price elasticities are Ϫ1.1 and Ϫ0.8.
We also estimate the regression interacting the effect of the subsidy with the initial number of computers per teacher. This estimate, presented in column 6 of table 4, is also consistent with a small convergence effect. Schools with more computers per teacher in the 1996-1997 school year are slightly less price-sensitive. However, the estimate of the interaction is not significant.
VI. Who Is Most Price-Sensitive?
The previous results, then, point to a significant impact of the E-Rate subsidy on public schools' Internet investment decisions. In this section we explore what types of schools are most sensitive to the subsidy.
Our first results, presented in table 6, examine differences in price sensitivity between primary and secondary schools. 17 These are shown in columns 1 and 2. We observe significant investment responses only by primary schools. High school point estimates are quite close to 0, but are imprecise. These regressions include all schools (appliers and nonappliers), so as to fully allow for the selection biases.
Next, in columns 3 and 4 of table 6, we present estimates for urban and rural schools. The results indicate that the rural schools are rather substantially less responsive to the subsidy program than are urban schools. One possible explanation is that rural schools may face higher prices for Internet services than urban schools do or are, perhaps, unable to get broadband at all, so that their net price of investment is greater despite having higher subsidy rates. In column 5 we interact the subsidy rate with the share of students in the school that are black, Hispanic, white, and Asian. Interestingly, the sensitivity is significantly higher among schools that are heavily black and Hispanic. The sensitivity of schools with high white and Asian enrollments is significantly smaller than for those with high black and Hispanic enrollments. Again note that these regressions do control for the school lunch percentage, so race is not just a simple proxy for poverty level. It is possible, however, that conditional on poverty status, higher-minority-population schools are more budget-constrained and therefore more sensitive to the subsidy rate.
VII. Outcomes
The analysis above presents evidence that the E-Rate program succeeded in its primary goal of getting classrooms connected to the Internet, particularly at disadvantaged schools [see the original statements of the program's proponents such as Riley, Glickman, and Kantor (1996) and Note: The dependent variable is the increase in the number of classrooms with Internet access per teacher since last year. All standard errors allow for district-level correlation in the error term. Observations are at the school level. There is a separate observation for each year of the sample, from 1997-1998 to 2000-2001 . Primary schools are defined as schools that house no grades above the ninth. Secondary schools, or high schools, are defined as schools that house at least one grade above the ninth. The first four columns report estimates from separate regressions run on samples indicated by the column headings. Column 5 reports results from a single regression in which the subsidy rate is interacted with the percentage in each racial/ethnic category. Gore (1997) ]. In this section, however, we extend the evaluation to the next logical level, which is to look at the impact of such investment on student performance. Many of the most prominent supporters of the E-rate program, such as Clinton's secretary of education Richard Riley, argued that the program should aspire to more than just wiring schools, that it "must show that it really makes a difference in the classroom, and that means helping students to learn the basics and other core subjects to high standards" (Riley, 1997) .
If the subsidy induced Internet investment, it is natural to ask whether this increase in Internet access led to changes in student achievement. To this end, we estimate the following test score equation:
where ⌬T s tϩ1 ϭ T s t ϩ 1 Ϫ T st is the 1-year change in the test score. All test-score regressions are estimated on the full sample of schools. The specification shown in equation (5) allows a year for Internet access to affect student achievement. We also allow for the possibility that achievement effects appeared with longer lags. Note that if s dt is a valid instrument for ⌬(I/C) st , then ␤Ј/␤ is the instrumental variables (IV) estimate of the effect of the change in Internet access per teacher on the change in test scores. We measure student achievement with the Stanford Achievement Test, which has been given every year to each public school student in California, beginning with the 1997-1998 school year. We use three measures of schoollevel achievement: the normalized mean test score in the school, the fraction of students scoring above the 75th percentile score for the nation, and the fraction of students scoring above the 25th percentile score for the nation. The mean is normalized so that the sample mean is 0 and the standard deviation across schools is 1. Thus the estimates are reported in units of school-level standard deviations. We allow Internet access to affect student achievement with a 1-year lag, and estimate specifications analogous to those reported in table 4.
The results are presented in table 7. The dependent variable is the increase in the school's test score, and the regressor of interest is the subsidy rate. In the reported specifications, we use the subsidy rate that the district would face if each school were included on the application. We include all California schools, both those that applied for the subsidy and those who did not. We report estimates for math, reading, and science test scores. 18 The results do not show evidence that Internet investment had a significant effect on student test scores. None of the estimates reported in the table are statistically different from 0, and all are quite small in magnitude. To see this, notice that the coefficient estimate of 0.023 on the mean math score for primary schools implies that a 90% subsidy rate would increase math test scores by approximately 2% of a cross-school standard deviation.
Though the standard errors are large, they are tight enough to rule out a substantial effect. A relevant comparison might be to ask whether, even at the most extreme end of the confidence interval on the subsidy coefficient, the E-Rate program increased test scores as much as did, say, other successful interventions in public schools such as the 0.22 student-level standard-deviation increase observed in Krueger's (1999) study of the Tennessee STAR class-size reduction experiments. 19 In our sample, the typical district was eligible for a 63% subsidy. Using the upper end of the 95% confidence interval of the primary school math estimate, a 63% subsidy would lead to an increase of approximately 0.099 school-level standard deviations. 20 The 95%
18 Results for language, spelling, and social studies tests are substantively the same.
19 Krueger (1999) reports effects in standard-deviation units across students rather than across schools. We have only school-and districtlevel data. The micro-level standard deviation across students is likely to be significantly greater than across schools (the standard deviation across schools is approximately 15%-20% greater than across districts), so a comparable comparison in our data would find effects smaller than what we report. 20 It is worth noting, though, that the comparable cost of the STAR experiment was much greater than the cost of the E-Rate. Standard errors in parentheses, 95% confidence interval at the mean subsidy in brackets. Note: Column 1 reports statewide means (and school-level standard deviation) of test scores. Percentile test scores are the percentages of students in each school year that score above the 75th or 25th percentile as calculated for the nation. Each entry in columns 2-4 of the table is the coefficient estimate on the subsidy variable (Sdt) from a separate regression. The dependent variable in these regressions is the change from year t to year t ϩ 1 in the relevant test score. Standard errors that allow for district-level correlation in the error term are listed in parentheses. In brackets is the 95% confidence interval of the estimate for a district with a 63% subsidy, the sample average.
confidence interval for a 63% price subsidy is listed in brackets for all estimates in the table.
Point estimates are larger for the fraction of students scoring above the national 75th percentile, though none is statistically significant. It is also notable that point estimates are larger for primary than for secondary schools, in light of primary schools' larger investment response. However, neither is statistically different from 0, and the difference between the primary and secondary test score results is not significant.
Of course, test scores are not the only measure of student performance, and the Internet might enhance students' learning in ways that do not show up on standardized tests. For the few non-test outcomes we have, though, such as the probability of taking advanced classes, the share of graduates going into the UC system (that is, the system with higher standards), and the overall dropout rate, we found no significant impact of Internet connections on performance. It is probably a stretch to expect to find the impact of technology subsidies on most of these variables, especially given the fact that we find no significant effect on Internet subsidies for high schools.
The E-Rate subsidy had two stated goals: to increase Internet access in schools and to improve student achievement. The evidence suggests rather strongly that it did the first. Regarding performance, there is no significant evidence of an impact, though the estimates are fairly imprecise. An absence of large student achievement gains might arise for any number of reasons. For one, this technology may not help measurable student achievement, though it may build skills that are unmeasured by standard tests. An equally plausible explanation is that people simply did not use the technology once they got it. This would certainly be consistent with the evidence discussed by U.S. Department of Education (2000b) that only one-third of teachers reported that they were well prepared or very well prepared to use computers and the Internet, or by Clarkson (2000) that most teachers surveyed are "novice or completely inexperienced" with computers. Without direct evidence on teacher time use in the classroom, we can only estimate the effect of Internet access and not of Internet usage.
It is also possible that technology improves education but only with a lag, so that it is too early to detect the impact on performance. Perhaps it takes time for the teachers to learn how to use the Internet in their classes. A lagged effect is unlikely to result from the cumulative nature of education, however, for the elementary school test results (where cumulative effects are not relevant) do not show any increase in performance. We address the possibility of a longer-lagged effect on test scores directly in table 8. The table shows test score estimates that correspond to those in table 7, except that they measure test score effects 2 years after observed Internet investment, rather than 1 year after. It does not appear that effects 2 years after the investment are larger in magnitude. Many of the point estimates go down over time, not up. One exception is the results for science mean test scores. These estimates, however, have exceptionally large standard errors. At least in the short run, no evidence support the view that schools are learning how to use Internet technology in a way that affects test scores with a lag.
Even if there were a large benefit to Internet investment that we cannot yet measure, we should not view such a lagged effect as having no cost. The subsidy costs more than two billion dollars per year, and the subsidies may lead schools to get locked in to inferior technologies or, at the least, lead them to buy at higher cost (given the extremely rapid declines in the price of computer-related goods). As an example, note that in table 2, almost 80% of total E-Rate funds were allocated to "internal connections," which includes the cost of wiring schools. Had the subsidy not accelerated investments, many schools could have avoided the costs of physical infrastructure by using the now common (and inexpensive) wireless networks. 
VIII. Conclusion
The rise of the Internet and the spread of a digital divide led to concern among policymakers about the implication for long-term economic inequality. This concern inspired the expansion of the Universal Service Fund to subsidize Internet and communication technology investment by more than $2 billion per year (itself more than half of all public school computer spending in the year). The expansion was implemented in 1998 and provided a sliding scale subsidy, called the E-Rate, between 20% and 90%.
In this paper, we have taken a first step toward evaluating the effect the E-Rate subsidy had on Internet investment in California's public schools. We find that despite the strong pre-1998 income gradient of Internet access, E-Rate funding went disproportionately to low-Internet schools. We also show evidence that the E-Rate subsidy led to significant increases in Internet investment. By 2000, there were some 68% more classrooms with Internet connections than there would have been without the subsidy. Urban schools, predominantly black and Hispanic schools, and primary schools are disproportionately responsive to the subsidy. Predominantly white and Asian schools, rural schools, and high schools show less sensitivity to the subsidy rates. Judged as a policy to close the digital divide among schools, the program clearly succeeded.
Judged as a means of improving student performance, however, we fail to find strong evidence of success. Despite the noticeable impact on the expansion of the Internet, estimated effects on test scores in a variety of subjects are indistinguishable from 0.
